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TRIAL BY JURY IN EQUITY CASES
M. T. VAN HECKE*
In England and in most of the American jurisdictions, there is no
right to a trial by jury on the issues of fact historically dealt with in
courts of equity. Normally, such issues are determined by the judge,
without a jury. Usually, however, the judge may, in his discretion, submit particular issues to a jury for an advisory verdict, "to enlighten his
conscience."' In one state he must so submit any disputed issue of fact
for an advisory verdict ;2 in others, he may not submit any issues unless
there is a serious conflict of evidence ;3 while in still others, the verdict
4
may not be disregarded, save for cause.
Professor of Law, University of North Carolina
A sampling of the authorities, often based on statutes, follows: 2 DANIELL,
CHANCERY

PLEADING AND

PRACTICE 1071 et. seq., 1147 n. 10 (4th Am. ed.

1871); THE ANNUAL PRAcTICE 590-591

(Eng. 1951); R. S. C. Order 36,

rule 3 and notes; FED. R. Crv. P. 39(c); 3 MooR, s FEDERAL PRAcncE 3023,

3031 (1938), and p. 49 (1950 Supp.); Am. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Timms
and Howard, 108 F. 2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.
2d 485 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Lucas v. Scott, 247 Ala. 183, 24 So. 2d 540 (1945) ; Donahue v. Babbitt, 26 Ariz. 542, 227 Pac. 995 (1924) ; Moore v. Burritt, 106 Colo. 413,
105 P. 2d 1084 (1940) ; Fisher v. Burgiel, 382 Ill. 42, 46 N. E. 2d 380 (1943) ;
Merritt v. Palmer, 289 Ky. 141, 158 S. W. 2d 163 (1942) ; N. H. REv. LAWS c. 370,
§ 14 (1942); Rubin v. Dairymen's League Coop. Ass'n., 18 N. Y. S. 2d 466,
aff'd, 284 N. Y. 32, 29 N. E. 2d 458 (1940) ; Flynn v. Sharon Steel Corp., 142
Ohio St. 145, 50 N. E. 2d 319 (1943) ; White v. Morrow, 187 Okla. 72, 100 P. 2d
872 (1940) ; Johnstone v. Matthews, 183 S. C. 360, 191 S. E. 223 (1937) ; Jackson
v. Gardner, 197 Wash. 276, 84 P. 2d 992 (1939); Powell v. Sayres, 134 W. Va.
653, 60 S. E. 2d 740, 745 (1950) ; In re Acme Brass and Metal Works, 225 Wis.
74, 272 N. W. 356 (1937).
As to common-law issues, such as damages, in equity cases, see Levin,
Equitable Clean-up and the Jury, 100 U. of PA. L. Rav. 320 (1951).
We do not know much about the actual operation of the discretionary, advisory
jury trial in equity cases. How frequently is such a jury trial granted or denied,
on the judge's or party's initiative, and on what criteria? What judicial controls
are imposed, in respect to the admission or exclusion of evidence, the instructions,
or the scope of the issues? To what extent do the trial judges adopt or reject the
advisory verdict, and on what criteria? The published court opinions are largely
silent on these and related matters, save for occasional observations that where
oral testimony on important issues is in serious conflict it is good sense for the
judge to send those issues to a jury and in most instances to abide by the verdict.
Perhaps there is more jury trial in equity cases, on this basis, than one would
suppose.
Greer v. Gosling, 54 Ariz. 488, 97 P. 2d 218 (1940) ; Stukey v. Stephens, 37
Ariz. 514, 295 Pac. 973 (1931)

(".

.

. while the court need not heed the advice

of the jury it must harken to it.").
'Eastern Finance Co. v. Gordon, 179 Va. 674, 20 S. E. 2d 522 (1942).
' Crocker v. Crocker, 188 Mass. 16, 73 N. E. 1068 (1905) ; Dose v. Ins. Co. of
State of Penn., 206 Minn. 114, 287 N. W. 866 (1939) ; cf. James v. Staples, 87
N. H. 49, 174 Atl. 59 (1934), supplanted by N. H. LAvs'c. 120 (1935), now N. H.
REv. LAws c. 370, § 14 (1942) (verdict advisory); and cf. S. C. CoDE ANN.
§ 593 (1942), which may be evaded by sending issues to jury for judge's aid and
enlightenment by advisory verdict. Johnstone v. Matthews, 183 S. C. 360, 141 S. E.
223 (1937).
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In sharp departure from this discretionary, advisory jury, thirteen
states have experimented with a right to trial by jury in equity cases,
with a binding verdict, 5 as at law. These are Arizona, Georgia, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
The procedure is widely operative today in Georgia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Texas. This paper explores this experience.
I
Virginia initiated the experiment in 1777 through a statute drafted
by Thomas Jefferson.7 This Act provided that in the new High Court
of Chancery "All matters of fact, material to the determination of the
cause, which in the course of the proceedings shall be affirmed by one
party and denied by the other, shall be tried by a jury upon evidence
given viva voce in the said court . . ." Six years laters, however, the
legislature repealed8 the statute, it having been found that this mode of
trial in equity cases was "expensive to the parties and inconvenient to

witnesses."
But another provision 9 of the 1777 statute has been continued in
force to this day,' 0 namely, that creating a right to a trial by jury if a
plaintiff in equity takes issue upon a plea. The court is then without
discretion to deny a jury trial and the verdict is binding, as at law.11
West Virginia has the same statute.12 The practice is rarely used, perhaps because any defense that could be asserted under a plea may now
be more conveniently asserted under an answer and because of a liberal
use, usually on the judge's initiative, of the discretionary, advisory jury
on the case as a whole.
' The term "binding verdict" is used in this paper to distinguish it from the
"discretionary, advisory verdict" contemplated by the first paragraph of the text.
It is not absolutely binding but may be set aside for cause.
This paper does not deal, except incidentally, with trial by jury in particular
statutory actions which are revisions of or supplements to historically equitable proceedings. See Ex Parte Baird, 240 Ala. 585, 200 So. 601 (1941) (quiet title)
Brady v. Carteret Realty Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 904, 67 Atl. 606 (1907) (quiet title);
McKenna v. Meehan, 220 App. Div. 690, 222 N. Y. S.379 (1927) (partition);
Lipscomb v. Condon, 56 W. Va. 416, 49 S.E. 392 (1904) (attachment).
'9 LAWS OF VIRGINIA 394 (Hening 1777), An Act for Establishing a High
Court
of Chancery.
7
MALONE, JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 250 (1948); 1 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 50 (Ford ed. 1892) (the Autobiography) : "In that one of the

bills for organizing our judiciary system which proposed a court of chancery, I

had provided for a trial by jury of all matters of fact in that as well as in courts of
law.,,
811 LAWS OF VIRGINIA 343 (Hening 1783).
'9 LAWS OF VIRGINIA 393 (Hening 1777).
10 VA. CODE § 8-213 (Michie, 1950).
11

Towson v. Towson, 126 Va. 640, 102 S. E. 48 (1920) ; Elmore v. MarylandVirginia Milk Producers' Ass'n., 145 Va. 42, 132 S. E. 521 (1926).
12 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5610 (Michie 1949).
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II

North Carolina undertook the experiment by statute in 1782. "In
1777, when the Superior Courts were established, equity jurisdiction
was denied to the judges on the ground that all issues of fact should be
tried by a jury. Session after session, lawyers combatted this view and
urged that the judges should have the powers of a chancellor ....
13
Equity jurisdiction was granted to the superior courts in 1782, but the
legislation provided-: "All matters of fact that shall come in issue between the parties shall be determined by a jury in the presence of the
court, as in trials at law, . . . and the mode of proceeding by such juries
shall be the same in every respect as in trial at law. .... "14

This right to a trial by jury with a binding verdict in equity cases 15
was operative in the North Carolina courts for forty-one years, until
1823. During this period, the courts dealt with the jury in equity as a
matter of course,16 without procedural incident. Then came Taylor v.
Person,'7 in 1822, reversing a decree because the facts in issue were not
decided by a jury. The court remarked: "The foregoing reasoning and
authorities apply with increased force to our Courts of Equity, in which
the law peremptorily requires that issues of fact shall be tried by a jury."
Within a year, in 1823, the legislature changed the procedure. The
new statute' 8 read: "It shall be the duty of the court to direct the trial
" 1 AsHE, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 714 (1908).
"N. C. Laws 1782, c. 11, § 3. The section concluded: "... the same rules

and methods to be observed in this case as have been practiced upon questions of
fact being submitted by a court of chancery to the decision of a common-law
jurisdiction." If this clause was an attempt to limit the effect of the conflicting
language quoted in the text to provision for a discretionary, advisory jury, it failed
until the passage of the Act of 1823. See note 18.
'" Compare Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal.Tdiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 78-79 (1923) : "The next change made by the Senate
was one which, if retained, would have completely altered the Federal judicial
procedure in equity trials. As noted above, one of the chief fears as to the new
Federal Government was lest it might infringe on the right to jury trial, so
cherished by the American colonists and their descendants, and lest it might adopt
the obnoxious equity powers of the British royal Governors. Now the Senate took

the extraordinary and radical step of amending the Draft Bill, so as to require jury
trials in all suits in equity. Luckily, at a later date, the Senate reversed its action."
18

Scott v. McDonald, 3 N. C. 98 (1799); Mourning v. Davis, 3 N. C. 219

(1802) ; Smith v. Bowen, 3 N. C. 296 (1804) (the editor's note to this case is
misleading: the statute referred to, providing for a discretionary, advisory jury,
was not enacted until 1823, and the Revised Statutes cited were not published until
1837; Jackson v. Marshall's Adm'r., 5 N. C.323 (1809) ; Jordan v. Black, 6 N. C.30
(1811); Thigpen v. Balfour, 6 N. C. 242 (1813) ; Williams v. Howard, 7 N. C.
74 (1819) ; Strudwick v. Ashe, 7 N. C. 207 (1819).
17 9 N. C. 298, 301. See also Kirby & Grice v. Newsance & Aycock, 9 N. C.
105, 107 (1822) : ". . . for the Court should not have proceeded to a decree...

until all the important facts were either admitted or found by a jury."
18 N. C. Laws 1823, c. 35. The need for such a statute had been voiced in 1821

by William Gaston. In a letter to Bartlett Yancey, who was to be in the next
legislature, Gaston, on July 15, 1821, outlined the conflicting views among leaders
of the bar as to the application of the Act of 1782, and continued: "The courts have
hitherto deemed it safest to have issues in every case. This practice is very inconvenient and exceedingly at variance with the nature and spirit of a Court of
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of such issues, as to the court may appear necessary, according to the
rules and practice in chancery in such cases, any law to the contrary
notwithstanding." This substituted the discretionary, advisory jury1 9
for the enlightenment of the judge's conscience, a practice that continued
for fifty years, until 1873, when the right to a trial by jury with a binding verdict in equity cases was restored on a constitutional basis. That
development is dealt with later in this paper. 20
III
Georgia established trial by a jury as of right with a binding verdict
in all equity cases by a statute2 ' enacted in 1792. As slightly amended
in 1797,22 the legislation provided: ". . . and if any case or matter in
dispute requires equitable interposition, . ..the judge presiding shall
exercise all the powers of a court of equity competent to compel the
parties ...in a cause, to discover on oath all requisite points necessary
to the investigation of truth and justice; which proofs, when obtained,
shall be submitted to a special jury, whose verdict shall be final. ..."
Although for a time the practice was thought to have acquired a constitutional status 23 under a provision of the Constitution of 1798 that
"trial by jury, as heretofore used in this state, shall be inviolate," it has
Equity. Where there is one great question of fact, or a few great questions of fact,
controverted between the parties, there is no difficulty in making an issue or two
and impanelling a jury to try them, but in the complicated and multifarious matters
which a Chancery suit sometimes involves to have the matter broken up into fifty
issues, and to have a dozen squabbles as to the wording of these issues and to
task the patience of the court to explain them to the jury ... and ultimately to
have the findings of the jury set aside because of their not comprehending the subject is anything but useful and decorous ... a short explanatory Act of Assembly
might remove such inconveniences. It might enact that all issues of fact in every
matter of equitable cognizance should be tried by a jury in the presence of the court
having cognizance thereof, and that issues of fact should be made up at the
discretion of the Court, and according to the usages of Chancery, to satisfy the
conscience of the Chancellor concerning doubts as to facts." Letters to Bartlett
Yancey, JAMES SPRUNT HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS, (University of North Carolina,
1911), vol. X, no. 2, p. 29; reprinted in SCHAUINGER, WILLIAM GASTON, CAROLINIAN, 109 (Bruce, 1949).
10Examples of its operation are: Cooper v. Cooper, 17 N. C. 298, 299 (1832)
("... no doubt, the court can decree upon the evidence; but the question is whether
it is proper to do so in the first instance, before trying an issue. It is also true
that after verdict the court is not bound to act on it, and, if it is not satisfactory,
may send it back to another trial, or even decree against the verdict. Nevertheless, it seems to be more proper that it should be tried at law first . ...")
Armsworthy v. Cheshire, 17 N. C. 456, 464 (1833) (conflict of testimony necessary) ; Kearney v. Harrell, 58 N. C. 199, 203 (1859) (same) ; Jackson v. Spivey,
63 N. C. 261, 264 (1869) (". . . the verdict of the jury is not positively binding

on the court, but it will not be lightly disturbed .

. . .")

; Peebles v. Peebles, 63

N. C. 656, 658 (1869) (test of credibility of witnesses).
20 See infra, at notes 51-57.
21 Ga. Laws 1792, no. 475, § 4; WATKINS DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA
481-2 (1800).
22 Ga. Laws 1797, no. 582, § 6; WATIlNS DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA
621 (1800).
'Hargraves v. Lewis, 7 Ga. 110, 126, 134 (1849); Mounce v. Byars, 11 Ga.
180, 185-8 (1852).
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long been regarded as wholly statutory 24 and is widely operative today.25 There has been no attempt to change the system.

IV
Massachusetts and New Hampshire have always had substantially
the same jury provision 26 in their constitutions: "In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more persons, except
in cases in which it has heretofore been otherwise used and practiced, the

parties have a right to trial by jury....." In a number of undocumented
dicta, 27 it was persistently asserted in both states, beginning in 1828 anti
1838, respectively, that this provision granted a constitutional right to a
trial by jury in equity cases as well as at law.

This view is traceable

to confusion as to the status of equity in the colonial period, to a popular
distrust of equity as administered by judges alone, and to a pervasive
confidence in the values of jury trial.

The course of decision, 28 however,

has been otherwise, leaving the availability of jury trial in equity dependent upon the judge's discretion.

It was concluded that the purpose

of the constitutional provision was to preserve jury trial as it was known
in common-law cases in England, except where local practice had dealt
with small-claims cases without a jury, and to leave intact the English
chancery practice as to trial of the facts by the judge, save as he deemed
jury trial desirable on particular issues.
V
The Texas Constitution of 1845 provided: "In the trial of all causes
in equity in the District Court, the plaintiff or defendant shall upon
"Mahan v. Cavendar, 77 Ga. 118, 121 (1886) ; Lamar v. Allen, 108 Ga. 158,
33 S. E. 958 (1899) ; Holton v. Lankford, 189 Ga. 506, 522, 6 S. E. 2d 304, 314
(1939).
The constitutional provision was held in Mahan v. Cavendar to have
had reference only to the right at common law as developed in England. In
Lamar v. Allen, at page 163 of the official report, the court indicated that although this decision was erroneous in the light of the language of the constitutional
provision, it had been too long accepted by the legislature and the courts to be
disturbed.
" The present statute is GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 37-1104, 24-3366, rule 6 (Harr.
-°MAss. BILL OF RIGHTS, ART. XV; N. H. BILL OF RIGHTS, ART.
XX.
27 Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 6
Pick. 376, 399 (Mass. 1828) ; Shaw v. Norfolk County Ry. Co., 16 Gray 407, 409
(Mass. 1860) ; Franklin v. Greene, 2 Allen 519, 522 (Mass. 1861) ; Marston v.
Brackett, 9 N. H. 336, 349 (1838) ; Hoitt v. Burleigh, 18 N. H. 389 (1846) ; Bell
v. Woodward, 48 N. H. 437, 442 (1869).
2" Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 7
Pick. 344, 364, 368-370 (Mass. 1829) ; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co.,
102 Mass. 45, 47 (1869) ; Parker v. Simpson, 180 Mass. 334, 62 N. E. 401, 404-409
(1902) ; Chase v. Revere House, 232 Mass. 88, 122 N. E. 162, 166 (1919) ; Bellows v. Bellows. 58 N. H. 60 (1876) ; Procter v. Green, 59 N. H. 350 (1879) ;
Davis v. Dyer, 62 N. H. 231 (1882) ; State v. Saunders, 66 N. H. 39, 25 At. 588
(1889) ; Curtice v. Dixon, 73 N. H. 393, 62 AtI. 492 (1905) ; Hatch v. Hillsgrove,
83 N. H. 91, 138 AtI. 428 (1927); Dion v. Cheshire Mills, 92 N. H. 414, 32
A. 2d 605 (1943) ; N. H. REv. LAWS c. 370, § 14 (1942). Cf. Copp v. Henniker,
55 N. H. 179, 210-211 (1875) ; Perkins v. Scott, 57 N. H. 55, 81-84 (1876).
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application made in open court, have the right of trial by jury, to be
governed by the rules and regulations prescribed in trials at law." 20
The constitutional convention of that year had rejected30 a proposal
for separate courts of chancery and had granted to the district court
jurisdiction of all civil cases "without regard to any distinction between
law and equity ... "31
The evolution of this explicit constitutional provision for jury trial
with a binding verdict in equity cases is unique. From 1836 to 1840,
the courts of the Republic of Texas administered the civil law inherited
from the Mexican regime, which made no distinction between common
law and equity.32

In 1840, the Congress of the Republic repealed the

civil law, made the English common law the basis of decision, and provided that law cases were to be tried by the principles of law, and
chancery cases by the principles of equity.3 3 Then, in 1841, the Congress authorized the judges in chancery cases to submit issues of fact to
a jury for an advisory verdict. 34 The Constitutional Convention of 1845
rebelled against the complications created by these legislative distinctions
between law and equity and adopted the constitutional provisions quoted
to restore the simplicity and flexibility of the original procedure. The
Convention was further motivated by a confidence in the jury as a trier
6f the facts in all cases and by a belief that there would be a greater
community satisfaction with the judicial process if the jury participated
35
in all cases.
This constitutional right to a trial by jury in equity cases as well a
at law has been continued 36 in force through all of the successive constitutions of Texas. The procedure is widely operative and there has
been no attempt to change the system. The judicial support of the policy
has been consistently vigorous.3 7
0
" ART. IV, § 16.
JOURNAL, TExAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

1846).
31

OF 1845, 191, 198 (Weeks,

ART. IV, § 10.

"Hemphill, in

DEBATES,

TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION

OF 1845, 256

(Weeks, 1846) ; Hemphill, C. J., in Smith v. Clayton, 4 Tex. 109, 113-114 (1849) ;
Butte, Early Development of Law and Equity in Texas, 26 YALE L. J. 699
(1917); Stayton, The General Issue in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REv. 345, 379, note
136 (1929); STAYTON, CASES ON TEXAS CIVL AcrioNs c. 1, § 2 (1952).
"Laws, Republic of Texas, Acts of January 20, 1840 and February 5, 1840,

pp. 3, 88-92 (1840).

"Laws,
Republic of Texas, Act of January 25, 1841, § 7, pp. 82-84 (1841).
5
DEBATES, TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVNTIONN OF

1845,

254,

256, 267-269,

271, 274-275 (Weeks, 1846). And see the discussions referred to in note 32.
"The present provision is ART. V, § 10: "In the trial of all causes in the
District Courts, the plaintiff or defendant shall, upon application made in open
court, have the right of trial by jury . . ." The blended jurisdiction of the
district court, "without regard to any distinction between law and equity ..
is found in ART. V, § 8.
"'Smith v. Clayton, 4 Tex. 109, 113-114 (1849) ; Carter v. Carter, 5 Tex. 93,
100 (1849) ; Wells v. Barnett, 7 Tex. 584, 586 (1852) ; Davis v. Davis, 34 Tex.
15, 23 (1870); Cockrill v. Cox, 65 Tex. 669, 672 (1886) ; Ex parte Allison, 99
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VI

A Tennessee statute of 1846 provided:

"...

it shall be the duty of

the chancellors of this state, upon the application of either of the parties,
to empanel a jury to try and determine any issue of fact involved in any
case pending in said courts, the finding of which jury shall be final and
conclusive upon the chancellor so far as the facts involved in the issue are
concerned. . . ."3 The origin of this enactment has been attributed to
the democratic trends initiated during the Jacksonian era and to criticism
of the separate court of chancery for "its asserted power to find facts
without the intervention of a jury. . .. "39 The new policy, replacing
the discretionary, advisory jury, was supported by the courts.40 Then,
in 1877, the legislature granted to the courts of chancery concurrent
jurisdiction over "all civil causes of action now triable in the Circuit
Court, except for injuries to person, property, or character, involving
unliquidated damages ... ."41 The courts of chancery now exercised
both equity and common-law powers 4 2 In 1919, dissatisfaction on the
part of some chancery lawyers and chancellors with juries in equity
cases led to a repeal 43 of the legislation authorizing jury trial in the
courts of chancery and to a provision for transfer to the circuit court of
law cases filed under the Act of 1877 in which jury trial was demanded.
Dissatisfaction with the transfer experience, however, outweighed the
dissatisfaction with juries in equity cases and in 1921 the former provisions were re-enacted. 44 Today, the use of juries with binding ver45
dicts in equity cases is widely prevalent.
Tex. 455, 462, 90 S.W. 870, 871 (1906); San Jacinto Oil Co. v. Culbertson,
100 Tex. 462, 101 S.W. 197 (1907) ; Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. State ex
rel Cobb, 133 S. W. 2d 827, 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), aff'd, 135 Tex. 25, 137
S. W.
2d 993 (1940). And see the discussions referred to in note 32.
88
Tenn. Acts January 20, 1846, c. 122, § 14.
" Williams, History of the Courts of Chancery of Tennessee, 2

6, 19-20 (1923).
"0James v. Brooks, 53
(1880).Tenn.

TENN.

L. REv.

Tenn. 150 (1871) ; Allen v. Saulpaw, 74 Tenn. 477, 479

4"
Acts 1879, c. 97, § 1.
" See Williams, supra note 39, at 19; Jackson v. Nimmo, 71 Tenn.
597 (1879) ; and TENN. CODE ANN. § 10377 (Williams 1934).
Tenn. Acts 1919, c. 90.
"Tenn. Acts 1921, c. 10. See Miller v. Washington County, 143 Tenn.
488, 226 S. W. 199 (1920); Exum v. Griffin Newbern Co., 144 Tenn. 239, 230
S. W. 601 (1921; Johnston v. C. N. 0. and T. P. Ry. Co., 146 Tenn. 135, 240
S. W. 429 (1922); Shepard and Gluck v. Thomas, 147 Tenn. 338, 246 S. W.
836 (1922) ; Bejack, The Chancery Court, 20 TENN. L. Rxv. 245, 251 (1948).
'The current statute is TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 10574, 10579 (Williams 1934).
See State ex rel Mynott v. King, 137 Tenn. 17, 191 S. W. 352 (1917) ; Greene
County Union Bank v. Miller, 18 Tenn. App. 239, 75 S. W. 2d 49 (1934); Third
Natl. Bank. v. Am.Equitable Ins. Co., 27 Tenn. App. 249, 178 S. W 2d 915 (1943);
Pass v. State, 181 Tenn. 613, 184 S. W. 2d 1 (1944); GIBSON's Surrs IN
'8

CHANCERY INT TENN.

§§ 548-554 (4th ed. by Higgins and Crownover, 1937).
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VII
Wisconsin statutes gave a right to a jury trial in mortgage foreclosure proceedings, with a binding verdict, from 1864 to 1868.
The Act of 18644a provided: "Every issue of fact joined in an action
brought . . . for the foreclosure or satisfaction of a mortgage on real
estate, which has been . . . executed to any corporation, upon demand
of either plaintiff or defendant, shall be tried by a jury, and the finding
of the jury... shall be final and conclusive, as in other cases of trial by
jury." In 1866, the court avoided a decision on "whether, under the
constitution of this state, it is competent for the legislature to make the
finding of a jury upon questions of fact in an equity case conclusive and
final, and not merely advisory," but suggested: ".... we do not suppose
it incumbent upon the circuit court to submit in an equity case the trial
47
of issues of fact to a jury, unless it thinks proper to -do so."1
The next year the legislature tightened the statute so as to require all
issues of fact in mortgage foreclosures to be tried by jury, unless there
were a written stipulation of waiver. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the
courts to decree sale or foreclosure, where there was an issue of fact,
without the intervention of a jury, was abrogated, unless there were
such a stipulation. And the verdict of the jury was to have the same
48
effect as in common-law cases.
9
In Callanan v. Judd,4 this statute was held to conflict with the state
constitutional provision that "the judicial power, both as to matters of
law and equity, shall be vested" in certain courts. "The power to decide
questions of fact, in equity cases, belonged to the Chancellor, just as
much as the power to decide questions of law. It was an inherent
part, and one of the constituent elements, of equitable jurisdiction ...it
would not be competent for the legislature to divest them [the courts]
of any part of it and confer it upon juries." Both cases arose over
efforts of farmers to obtain trial by jury as to the conditional character
of the delivery of mortgage notes given to finance railway construction
in 1855.
VIII
North Carolina re-established50 a right to a trial by jury in equity
cases, with a binding verdict, in 1873, by judicial construction of the
Constitution of 1868.
The Constitution provided: "The distinctions between actions at law
and suits in equity . . . shall be abolished; and there shall be in this
'State but one form of action... which shall be denominated a civil action
"Wis. Laws 1864, c. 169.
" Truman v. McCollum, 20 Wis. 360, 373 (1866).
" Wis. Laws 1867, c. 79.
" 23 Wis. 343, 348 (1868).
0 For the previous experience,
see text at notes 13-19.
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.... Feigned issues shall also be abolished, and the facts at issue tried by
order of court before a jury.5' . . . In all issues of fact, joined in any
court, the parties may waive the right to have the same determined by
a jury ....
In 1872, in Goldsborough v. Turner,53 without reference to the Consitution, the court interpreted the Code of Civil Procedure 54 of 1868
as authorizing a discretionary, advisory jury in an equity case.
At the next term, in Lee v. Pearce,55 this was overruled: "Nor is a
construction admissible, which would impose on the Judge of the
Superior Court the duty of trying issues of fact except when by consent
of the parties, the Judge is substituted for a jury, for such a construction
is opposed by the Constitution, '.

.

. In all issues of fact joined in any

Court, the parties may waive the right to have the same determined by
a jury,' etc., in the absence of such waiver 'all issues of fact' under the
new system must be tried by a jury.56 These are constitutional provisions, and the provisions of C. C. P. and all other legislative acts must
be construed in reference to the Constitution."
Since then, trial by jury in equity cases, with a binding verdict, has
been widely used, 57 without any attempt to change the system, save in
connection with compulsory references (See notes 96-103 infra)

Ix
Indiana had a right to a trial by jury in equity cases from 1874 to
1881, by judicial construction of an Act of 1852, an adaptation of the
New York Code of Civil Procedure: "Issues of law must be tried by the
court. Issues of fact must be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is
waived." ,8 In 1874, the court held that the statute applied "whether the
action be one which would formerly have been at law or in equity."59
1 ART. IV,
1.
"ART.
IV, §§ 18,
now § 13.
'67 N. C. 403, 409 (1872).
224: "An issue of fact, in an action for the recovery of money only, or of
specific real or personal property, or for a divorce . . . must be tried by a jury,
'

unless a jury trial be waived,

...

or a reference be ordered

. . . ."

§ 225: "Every

other issue is triable by the court, or the judge thereof, who, however, may order
the whole issue, or any specific question of fact involved therein, to be tried by a
jury, or may refer it, . . ." These came from New York. See CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 95 et seq. (2d ed. 1947) ; Kharas, A Century of Law-Equity Merger in
New York, 1 SYR. L. Rav. 186, 200 (1949).
68 N. C. 76, 82, 89 (1873). See also Chasteen v. Martin, 81 N. C. 51, 55
(1879) ; Worthy v. Shields, 90 N. C. 192, 194, 196 (1884).
" As to the judicial construction of similar statutory provisions, see accord,
Hopkins v. Greensburg Turnpike Co., 46 Ind. 187 (1874) ; contra: Gallagher
v. Basey, 1 Mont. 457, 461 (1872), afd. 20 Wall. 670, 680 (U.S. 1875); Arnold
v. Sinclair, 12 Mont. 248, 277, 29 Pac. 1124, 1133 (1892).
" The present statute is N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-172 (1943) : "An issue of fact
must be tried by a jury, unless a trial by jury is waived or a reference ordered.
See Crew v. Crew, 236 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 2d 309 (1952).
"IND. REv. STAT. Vol. II, Pt. 2, § 320 (1852).
" Hopkins v. Greensburg Turnpike Co., 46 Ind. 187, 194 (1874). See also
Edwards v. Applegate, 70 Ind. 325 (1880). Accord: Lee v. Pearce, 68 N. C. 76,
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In 1881 the legislature restored the discretionary, advisory jury in equity
cases by an act 6" which provided: "Issues of law and issues of fact
in causes that, prior to the eighteenth day of June, 1852, were of exclusively equitable jurisdiction, shall be tried by the court," save as the
court might send an issue of fact to a jury for the court's information."'
X
From 1887 to 1889, a Michigan statute 2 provided: "Either party to a
cause in chancery shall be entitled to a jury ... and the verdict on any
question of fact shall have the same effect . . . as a verdict of a jury in
an action at law." This statute was held unconstitutional in 1889 in
Brown v. Kalamazoo CircuitJudge:63 "The functions of judges in equity
cases in dealing with [issues of fact] is as well settled a part of the judicial power . . . as the functions of jurors in common-law cases ...
The right to have equity controversies dealt with by equitable methods
is as sacred as the right of trial by jury .... Any change which transfers
the power that belongs to a judge to a jury ... is as plain a violation of
the constitution as one which should give the courts executive or legislative power vested elsewhere." The statute was found to be "so imperfect and incongruous as to be void for its deficiencies." The court
feared that equity cases were often too complex, with too many parties,
to be determined by a jury. The difficulties in devising specific relief,
as compared with verdicts for the recovery of money or property, were
thought to be too formidable for a jury. General verdicts in equity
cases were regarded as impractical and special verdicts as too confusing.
XI
In Arizona, prior to 1901, a trial by jury in an equity case was
available only when the judge, in his discretion, deemed one necessary
for the enlightenment of his conscience, and the verdict was wholly advisory.64 In that year, the legislature provided :65 "In all cases, both at
law and in equity, either party shall have the right to submit all issues
of fact to a jury." The origin of this statute is obscure. And it was long
overlooked. Instead the former practice of discretionary, advisory juries
82, 89 (1873) ; Chasteen v. Martin, 81 N. C. 51, 55 (1879) ; Worthy v. Shields,
90 N. C. 192, 194, 196 (1884). Contra: Gallagher v. Basey, 1 Mont. 457, 461
(1872), aff'd, 20 Wall. 670, 680 (U.S. 1875); Arnold v. Sinclair, 12 Mont. 248,
277, 29 Pac. 1124, 1133 (1892).
"I1ND. REV. STAT. § 409 (1881).
" See Hendricks v. Frank, 86 In d. 278 (1882) ; Evans v. Nealis, 87 Ind. 262
(1882) ; Ikerd v. Beavers, 106 d. 483 (1886).
"Mich. Laws 1887, no. 267, p. 358.
"~75 Mich. 274, 42 N. W. 827, 830 (1889). See also Detroit Nat. Bank v.
Blodgett, 115 Mich. 160, 73 N. W. 885 (1898).
"Henry v. Mayer, 6 Ariz. 103, 53 Pac. 590 (1898) ; Egan v. Estrada, 6 Ariz.
248, 56 Pac. 721 (1899).

"hR. S. Aaiz. § 1389 (1901).
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1953]

in equity was continued. 66 In Brown v.Greer,67 the effect of this statute as creating a right to a jury trial in equity was revealed and held to
be preserved inviolate by the subsequently adopted bill of rights.
However, in 1913,'0s the legislature had provided: "In all actions
where equitable relief is sought the court shall, if a jury be demanded
by either party, submit to the jury all controverted questions of fact....
In every such case the verdict shall be binding upon the court in the
determination of the.action, unless set aside. . .

."

It has been said that

this change was brought about by a member of the legislature who
had an equity suit that he felt he could win if the verdict of a jury
in an equity case were binding upon the court. In any event, the new
statute, including its detailed regulation of the character of the interrogatories, was reluctantly enforced.P
In 1921, at the suggestion of one of the trial judges, the pre-1901
practice was restored :70 ". . . the court, in its discretion, may submit
written interrogatories to the jury . . .the verdict of the jury shall be

deemed advisory to the court ...." In Donahue v. Babbitt,71 the restoration was held constitutional and Brown -i. Greer72 was repudiated, insofar as it had attempted constitutionally to preserve the right to a jury
trial created by the Act of 1901. This statute is still in force. The
court, however, continues to regard jury trial in equity as mandatory
unless waived, 73 though the verdict is only advisory.
XII
A South Dakota statute, 74 from 1917 to 1926, gave a right to a jury
whose verdicts were to be binding and not advisory on issues of fact in
equity proceedings de novo in the circuit court on appeal from the county
court in probate matters. In State v. Nieuwenhuis,75 this was held
unconstitutional, as applied to an action to establish a lost will, in reli76
ance on Brown v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge.
"Taggart Merc. Co. v. Clack, 8 Ariz. 295, 71 Pac. 925 (1903); Dooley v.
Burlington Gold Mining Co., 12 Ariz. 332, 100 Pac. 797 (1909).
'716
Ariz. 215, 141 Pac. 841 (1914).
08 Civ. CoDE ARiz. § 542
(1913).
00 Corbett v. Kingan, 16 Ariz. 440, 146 Pac. 922 (1915) ; Smith v. Mosbarger,
18 Ariz. 19, 156 Pac. 79 (1916) ; Costello v. Cunningham, 19 Ariz. 512, 172 Pac.
664 (1918) ; and see Arizona State Bank v. Crystal Ice and Cold Storage Co.,
26 Ariz. 82, 222 Pac. 407 (1924).
70 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1921, c. 125, now Aiuz. CoDE ANN. § 21-1010 (1939).

26 Ariz. 542, 227 Pac. 995 (1924).

16 Ariz. 215, 141 Pac. 841 (1914).
Mounce v. Wrightman, 30 Ariz. 45, 243 Pac. 916 (1926) ; Stukey v. Stephens,
37 Ariz. 514, 295 Pac. 973 (1931); and Greer v. Gosling, 54 Ariz. 488, 97 P.
2d 218 (1940) ("... while the court need not heed the advice of the jury, it must
harken to it.")
' S. D. Sess. Laws 1917, c. 182.
7049 S.D. 181, 207 N. W. 77 (1926).
7075 Mich. 274, 42 N. W. 827 (1889), noted herein at note 63.
70
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XIII
The operation of trial by jury in equity cases, in the four states where

it most widely prevails, namely, Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee,
and Texas, may best be examined at four strategic points:
(1) Jury trial is available only at final hearing on the issues of fact

framed by the pleadings 77 or on those material to or determinative of

the case, 78 and not in administrative, 79 interlocutory, 0 or contempt s
matters.
(2) The jury does not bring in a general verdict but a special verdict, consisting of answers to specific interrogatories as to the facts. On

the basis of these findings of fact by the jury and of the case as a whole
the judge exercises the chancellor's discretion as to the character of the
82
relief to be granted, if any, and upon what conditions.

1 Armfield v. Brown, 70 N. C. 27, 29-33 (1874); Ely v Early 94 N. C. 1, 9
(1886) ; State ex rel. Carr v. Askew, 94 N. C. 194, 211-213 (18) ,;
Nimocks v.
McIntyre, 120 N. C. 325, 26 S. E. 922 (1897); Grantham v. Nunn, 188 N. C.
239, 124 S. E. 309 (1924); Young v. Pittman, 224 N. C. 175, 29
S.E. 2d 551
(1944) ; Icenhour v. Bowman, 233 N. C. 434, 64 S. E. 2d 428 (1951) Town of
Fremont v. Baker, 236 N. C. 253, 72 S. E. 2d 666 (1952).
S. Hieber v. Buchanan, 202 Ga. 831, 44 S. E. 2d 647 (1947); Ragland v.
Rowe, 207 Ga. 441, 62 S. E. 2d 171 (1950); McElya v. Hill, 105 Tenn. 319, 59
S. W. 1025 (1900).; Madison Trust Co. v. Stahlman, 134 Tenn. 402, 183 S. W.
1012 (1916) ; First Nat. Bank of Ripley v. Barbee, 150 Tenn. 355, 265 S. W. 371
(1921); Hibernian Bank & Trust Co. v. Boyd, 164 Tenn. 376, 48 S. W. 2d 1084
(1932) ; Letellier-Phillips Paper Co. v. Fiedler, 32 Tenn. App. 137, 222 S. W. 2d
42 (1949) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 10578 (Williams 1934) ; Sante Fe Tovnsite Co.
v. Norvell, 55 (Tex. Civ. App. 485, 118 . W. 762 (1909); Williams v. Tyler, 258
S. W. 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Squyres v. Rasmussen, 296 S. W. 97 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927).
SBeavans v. Goodrich, 98 N. C. 217, 223, 3 S. E. 516 (1887) (allotment of
homestead) ; Ledbetter v. Pinner, 120 N. C. 455. 27 5. E. 123 (1897) (partitionactual or by sale); McMillan v. McMillan, 123 N. C. 577, 31 S. E. 729 (1898)
(partition-equality of shares); Cleve v. Adams, 222 N. C. 211, 22 S. E. 2d
567 (1942) (motion to set aside judgment)y; Coker v. Coker, 224 N. C. 450, 31
S. E. 2d 364 (1944) (motion to set aside judgment); City Nat. Bank v. Bridgers,
114 N. C. 381, 19 S. E. 642 (1894) (appointment of receiver); Holton v. Lankford, 189 Ga. 506, 6 S. E. 2d 304, 314 (1939) (appointment of receiver) ; Ferguson
v. Ferguson, 210 S. W. 2d 268 (TeA. Civ. App. 1948) (receiver's report); McHenry v. Banker's Trust Co., 206S. W. 2d 560, 572 (Tea. Civ. App. 1918) (rate

determination by receiver of water project).

"Young v. Pittman, 224 N. C. 175, 29 5. E. 2d 551 (1944); Town of Fremont
E. 2d 666 (1952) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 37-1101 (Harr.
v. Baker, 236 N. C. 253, 5S.
1936) ; Hieber v. Buchanan, 202 Ga. 8311,44 . E. 2d 647 (1947); Campbell v.
Peacock, 176 S. W. 774 (Tea. Civ. App. 1915) ; Stolte v. Karran, 191 . W. 600
(Tea. Civ. App. 1917) ; Oil Lease & Royalty Syndicate v. Beeler, 217 S. W.
1054 (Tea. Civ. App. 1920).

"' Salle Mfg. Co. v. Arnold, 228 N. C. 375, 45 S. E. 2d 577 (1947) ; Lewis v.
Theodoro, 33 Ga. App. 355, 126 S. E. 158 (1925) ; Pass v. State, 181 Tenn. 11.
184 S. W. 2d 1 (1944) ; Ex parte Allison, 48 Tea. Cr. App. 634, 90 S. W. 492
(1905), 99 Tea. 455, 462, 90 S. W. 870, 871 (1906).
"2Whitted v. Fuquay, 127 N. C. 68, 71. 37 S. E. 141 (1900) ; Boles v. Caudle,
133 N. C. 528, 532, 45 S. E. 835 (1903) ; Knott v. Cutler, 224 N. C. 427, 31 S. E.
2d 359 (1944) ; Mounce v. Byars, 11 Ga. 180, 185-8 (1849) ; Carter v. Lipsey, 70
Ga. 417, 422 (1883) ; Hardin v. Foster, 102 Ga. 180, 29 S. E. 174 (1897) ; McWhorter v. Ford, 142 Ga. 554, 83 S. E. 134 (1914) ; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 37-11104,
24-3366. rule 6 (Harr. 1936) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 167 Tenn. 606,
72 S. W. 2d 778 (1934) ; Third Nat. Bank v. Am. Equitable Ins. Co., 27 Tenn.
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(3) In certain areas, such as parol trusts or reformation for mistake, the chancellors, to safeguard their findings, have required that the
evidence amount to something more than a mere preponderance (though
less than beyond a reasonable doubt), namely, that the evidence be dear,
cogent (or strong), and convincing.8 3 How has this standard been applied in trial by jury?
In order to get to the jury, some courts have required that the evidence comply with the higher standard.8 4 Others submit the issue if
there is anything more than a scintilla and let the jury determine, under
appropriate instructions, whether the evidence is clear, cogent, and con85
vincing.
Texas permits jury verdicts to be based on a mere preponderance of
the evidence.8 6 But the court may set a verdict aside if not supported
8
by c.c.c. evidence.
Instructions to the jury have caused trouble. To impose a requirement that the jury be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt was clearly
wrong.88 So, except in Texas, was the other extreme of a mere preponderance. 53 To combine in one set of instructions both the c.c.c. test
and the preponderance test was too confusing. 0 And an instruction
was thought to be unduly severe on the plaintiff when it defined a preponderance as "evidence which is of greater or superior weight or that
gives greater assurance and carries conviction to the minds of the
jury" and then defined c.c.c. evidence as "evidence that is clearer,
stronger, more cogent and convincing in its character and weight than
App. 249, 178 S. W. 2d 915, 919 (1943); Scarborough v. Isham, 29 Tenn. App.
216, 196 S. W. 2d 73 (1946) ; Southern Housing Co. v. Martin, 242 S. W. 2d 843
(Tenn. App. 1950); Hall v. Layton, 10 Tex. 55, 60 (1853); Henyan v. Trevino,
137 S.
W. 458, 482-483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
"3Brame v. Read, 136 Va. 219, 118 S. E. 117 (1923) ; Shapiro v. Albany Ins.
Co., 56 R. I. 18, 183 AtI. 578 (1936).
94 N. C. 1, 9 (1886) ; Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Tenn. 1, 80 S. W. 2d
Ely v. ;Early,
666 0'(1935)
Greenwood v. Maxey, 190 Tenn. 599, 231 S. W. 2d 315 (1950). See
Bejack, The Chancery Court, 20 TENx. L. REv. 245, 251 (1948).
" Gillespie v. Gillespie, 187 N. C. 40, 120 S. E. 822 (1923); Sills v. Ford,
171 N. C. 733, 88 S. E. 636 (1916); Highsmith v. Page, 158 N. C. 226, 73 S. E.
998 (1912) ; Malone, Reformation of Writings inder the Law of North Carolina,
15 N. C. L. REv. 155, 158-159 (1937); GEORGIA CODE AN. § 37-202 (Harr.
1936) (for equitable relief against mistake "the evidence shall be clear, unequivocal
and decisive as to the mistake.") ; Yahlon v. Metropolitan L. I. Co., 200 Ga. 693,
705, 38 S. E. 2d 534, 541 (1946); Minor v. Fincher, 206 Ga. 721, 58 S. E. 2d
389, 394 (1950).
;'Kraus v. Cornell, 116 S. W. 2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
8" Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 227 S. W. 2d 206, 209 (1950).
" Newberry v. McCook, 146 Ga. 679,, 92 S. E. 67 (1917) ; Lee v. Pearce, 68
N. C. 76, 89 (1873).
" Ely v. Early, 94 N. C. 1, 7 (1886); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 187 N. C. 40,
120 S. E. 822 (1923) ; Peterson v. Taylor, 203 N. C. 673, 166 S. E. 800 (1932)
Fid. & Dep. Co. of Md. v. State Hwy. Dept., 174 Ga. 443, 163 S. E. 174 (1932);
compare Robertson v. Rigsby, 148 Ga. 81, 95 S. E. 973 (1918).
"0McWhirter v. McWhirter, 155 N. C. 145, 71 S. E. 59 (1911).
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that required in ordinary civil cases where the burden of proof is satisfied by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence."' 91
(4) It is with respect to compulsory references, that the picture is
most interesting.
The Tennessee statute excludes from jury trial in equity: "... cases
involving complicated accounting, as to such accounting, 'and those
elsewhere excepted by law or the provisions of this code." 9 2 And
exceptions to a master's report are to be tried to the judge on motion or at the hearing of the cause.9 3
The Georgia statute enables exceptions of fact to an auditor's report
in an equity case to be tried by a jury if the judge approves.0 4
In Texas, the constitutional right to trial by jury in equity cases
extends to the issues of fact raised by exceptions to the reports of audi95
tors and masters.
In North Carolina, a statute 6 provides: "Where the parties do not
consent, the court may, upon the application of either, or of its own
motion, direct a reference in the following cases: ...
"5. Where the issues of fact and questions of fact arise in an action
of which the courts of equity of the state had exclusive jurisdiction prior
to the adoption of the constitution of one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-eight, and in which the matter or amount in dispute is not less
than the sum or value of five hundred dollars.
"The compulsory reference under this section does not deprive either
party of his constitutional right to a trial by jury of the issues of fact
arising on the pleadings, 97 but such trial shall be only upon the written
evidence taken before the referee."98
And the North Carolina court has ruled that: "A party who would
preserve his right to a jury trial in a compulsory reference must object
to the order of reference at the time it is made, and on the coming in
of the report of the referee, if it be adverse, he should seasonably file
exceptions to particular findings of fact made by the referee, tender
" McCorkle v. Beatty, 225 N. C. 178, 33 S. E. 2d 753 (1945) ; and see Henley

v. Holt, 221 N. C. 274, 20 S. E. 2d 62 (1942). For the appropriate instructions, see
Williams v. Greensboro Fire Ins. Co., 209 N. C. 765, 185 S. E. 21 (1936);
McCorkle
v. Beatty, 226 N. C. 338, 342, 38 S. E. 2d 102, 105 (1946).
2

1 TENN.

CODE ANN.

§ 10574 (Williams 1934). See Greene County Union Bank

v. Miller, 18 Tenn. App. 239, 75 S. W. 2d 49 (1934).
"TENN. CODE ANN. § 10605, Rule III, § 7 (Williams 1934).
"GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-402, 37-1103 (Harr. 1936). See Lamar v. Allen, 108
Ga. 158, 33 S. E. 958 (1899) ; Mitchell v. Turner, 190 Ga. 485, 9 S.E. 2d 621

(1940).

" Hamm v. J. Stone & Sons Live Stock Co., 13 Tex. Civ. App. 414, 35 S.W.
427 (1896); San Jacinto Oil Co. v. Culbertson, 100 Tex. 462, 101 S. W. 197
(1907). The reports are not evidence.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-189 (1943).

"rAs distinguished from issues of fact arising merely from exceptions to the

referee's findings. State ex rel. Carr v. Askew, 94 N. C. 194, 211-212 (1886).
"These two paragraphs were added by P. L. 1897, c. 237.
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appropriate issues based on the facts pointed out in the exceptions and
raised by the pleadings, and demand a jury trial on each of the issues
thus tendered." 99 Otherwise, a jury trial is waived.
Does this combination of compulsory references in equity cases, of
trial upon the transcript of evidence before the referee, and of waiver by
easy default jeopardize jury trial in equity cases in North Carolina?
The statute limiting the jury to the transcript of the evidence before
the referee has been held constitutional. 0 Even so, the jury is largely
deprived of the opportunity to appraise the credibility of the witnesses.
However, the court may, in its discretion, deny a motion for a compulsory reference. 10 1 And most have been sought or granted in cases involving accounts and boundaries ;102 relatively few have been equity
cases'0 a arising under the section quoted.

XIV
Is there a constitutional right in equity cases to a trial of the facts
by the judge alone, assisted perhaps by an advisory jury, so as to
deprive the legislature of power to establish by statute a right to trial by
jury with a binding verdict? Eight courts have answered in the affirmative. The Michigan, 104 South Dakota, 10 5 and Wisconsin 0 6 cases have
already been noted. The others are from Montana, 10 7 New Jersey, 10 the
"' Cheshire v. First Presbyterian Church, 225 N. C. 165, 169, 33 S. E. 2d 866
(1945). For the complete formula, applicable to the various situations, see
Booker v. Town of Highlands, 198 N. C. 282, 285-286, 151 S. E. 635 (1930).
200 Chesson v. Kieckhefer Container Co., 223 N. C. 378, 26 S. E. 2d 904 (1943).
The findings, conclusions, and report of the referee are excluded. Cherry v.
(1949).
Andrews, 231 N. C. 261, 266, 56 S. E.N.2dC.703
354, 707, 57 S. E. 2d 377 (1950).
101 Veazey v. City of Durham, 231
1 2
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-189, subdivisions 1-4 (1943); MCINTosH, N. C.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 522 (1929).
Taylor v. Smith, 118 N. C. 127, 24 S. E. 792 (1896) (parol trust) ; Pinchback v. Bessemer Mining and Mfg. Co., 137 N. C. 172, 49 S. E. 106 (1904)
(reformation); Murchison Nat. Bank v. McCormick, 192 N. C. 42, 133 S. E.
183 (1926) (long and complicated account); Grady v. Faison, 224 N. C. 567,
31 S. E. 2d 760 (1944) (specific performance) ; Pure Oil Co. v. Baars, 224 N. C.
612, 31 S. E. 2d 854 (1944) (specific performance) ; Cheshire v. First Presbyterian
Church, 224 N. C. 165, 33 S. E. 2d 866 (1945) (trust); Veazey v. City of
Durham, 231 N. C. 354, 57 S. E. 2d 377 (1950) (injunction).
10, Brown v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 274, 42 N. W. 827, 830 (1889);
see text at note 63.
10' State v. Nieuwenhuis, 49 S. D. 181, 207 N. W. 77 (1926) ; see text at note
75.
"'Callanan v. Judd, 23 Wis. 343, 348 (1868) ; see text at note 49.
10'

Arnold v. Sinclair, 12 Mont. 248, 277, 29 Pac. 1124, 1133 (1892)

("

. . we

do not find anything in that statute which indicates an intention to change, or
trench upon, the equity functions of the court respecting the finding of the jury
upon an issue presented to it in an equitable action. If such intention was manifest
in said statute, the question would then arise whether the legislature had power,
considering the organic act under which the legislature existed when said statute
was passed, to make such change in the equity power of the court; and the further
question whether under the provisions of our constitution such a statute could
have effect.") See also Gallagher v. Basey, 1 Mont. 457 (1872), aff'd, 20 Wall.
670, 680 (U. S. 1875), noteJ.118.
367, 380, 66 A. 2d 719, 725 (1949) (the statute "was
0I Steiner v. Stein, 2 N.
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South Carolina,110
U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
111
and Utah.
On the contrary, Arizona, 12 the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, n" Indiana," 4 New York, n'6 Oklahoma," 6 and West
Virginia" 7 ,have taken the position that there is no such limitation and
that the legislature is free.
The Supreme Court of the United States seems now to have held
in effect that the Congress has power to require the trial of the facts on
an equitable issue by the jury instead of by the judge, even in a state
court. Earlier, it had avoided a ruling on the issue, while expressing
grave doubts." 8 But in 1952, in a 5 to 4 decision," 9 it 'declared that
0D

not and could not have been intended to grant a jury trial as of right as to incidental
legal issues such as money damages involved in a suit in Chancery wherein equitable remedies were sought. To have so construed this statute would have been
to render it unconstitutional as an improper infringement upon the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery.") See also Van Houten v. Van Houten, 68
N. J. Eq. 358, 59 Atl. 555 (1904).
""Michaelson v. U. S. ex reL. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 291 Fed. 940,
946 (7th Cir. 1923) ("Congress cannot constitutionally deprive parties in an equity
court of the right of trial by the chancellor.")
"'Hammond v. Foreman, 43 S. C. 264, 21 S. E. 3, 4 (1895) ; Johnstone v.
Matthews, 183 S. C. 360, 191 S: E. 223, 225 (1937) (statute depriving chancellor
of discretionary, advisory jury would violate state constitution relating to equity
powers of the Court of Common Pleas).
1 Campbell v. Gowans, 35 Utah 268, 288, 100 Pac. 397, 401 (1909) (state
supreme court has state constitutional duty to determine whether findings of fact
in equity cases are such as were called for by the evidence).
("That the legis12 Brown v. Greer, 16 Ariz. 215, 141 Pac. 841, 843 (1914)
lature had the power to enact the statute is not questioned.") See text at notes
67 and 71.
.18
Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 136 F. 2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1927) ("a defendant
[in equity] has no constitutional right to a trial by the court without a jury.")
.'Hopkins v. Greensburg Turnpike Co., 46 Ind. 187, 194 (1874) (the legislature may extend jury trial beyond the minimum guaranteed by the constitution).
See text at note 59.
1'
Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. Andersen, 239 N. Y. 285, 146 N. E. 381, 385 (1925)
(statutory jury trial in equitable defenses: "The question was one not of constitutional privilege, but of the meaning of legislation.") ; Phillips v. Gorham, 17
N. Y. 270, 273 (1858) ("But there was nothing in either constitution which prevented the legislature from imposing the necessity of jury trial in all cases.")
("There is no
11' White v. Morrow, 187 Okla. 72, 100 P. 2d 872, 873 (1940)
constitutional guarantee as to the right of trial exclusively by the court without
the 1intervention of a jury . . . ." in equity cases.)
2 7Lipscomb v. Condon, 56 W. Va. 416, 49 S. E. 392, 402 (1904)

("That it is
competent for the legislature to require jury trial in equity proceedings cannot
be doubted.")
11

Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670, 680 (U.S. 1875)

("...

the relief which

equity affords must still be applied by the court itself, and all information presented to guide its action, whether obtained through masters' reports or findings
of a jury, is merely advisory. . . . This discretion to disregard the findings
of the jury may undoubtedly be qualified by statute . . "); Michaelson v. U. S.,
266 U. S. 42, 65 (1924) (". . . we are at once relieved of the doubt which might

otherwise arise in respect of the authority of Congress to set aside the settled
rule that a suit in equity is to be tried by the chancellor without a jury unless he
choose to call one as purely advisory.")
v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown IL Co., 342 U. S.359, 363 (1952),
1'Dice
commented upon in 37 CORNELL L. Q. 799, 802 (1952) and 27 N. Y. U. L. Rv.
369 (1952). Compare the Susquehanna case, supra note 115, and Liberty Oil Co.
v. Condon Nat. Bank, 260 U. S.235 (1922).
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TRIAL BY JURY IN EQUITY CASES

the Federal Employer's Liability Act requires a state court in an action
for damages to try the equitable issue of fraud in the inducement of a
release by jury with a binding verdict, and reversed an Ohio decision
affirming a trial judge's finding that there was no fraud, notwithstanding a jury's verdict that there was.
The courts which have asserted that there is a constitutional right in
equity cases to a trial of the facts by the judge alone, appear to have
been motivated by (a) tradition, (b) respect for the chancellor's professional skill as a trier of facts, (c) a consciousness that the need for a
court of equity had arisen in part from the limitation that jury trial
had imposed upon the adequacy of various common-law actions, (d) an
over-literal application of state constitutional provisions relating to the
structure of state courts, (e) an unsympathetic reaction to early legislative attempts to fuse the administration of law and equity into one procedural system, and (f) an uninformed fear of how jury trial would work
in equity cases.
Significantly, none of these courts seems to have been aware of the
experience with trial by jury in equity cases in Arizona, Georgia,
Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, outlined in this paper. It is believed that this experience tips the scales against the validity of the asserted limitation and in favor of the legislative power to experiment with
this procedure- 2 0
XV
This experience may be summarized thus:
It ended with judicial declarations of unconstitutionality in Michigan,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Supposed constitutional authority was
found lacking in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. The statutory
authority was repealed in Arizona, Indiana, North Carolina (the earlier
phase), and Virginia. And the present statute in Virginia and West
Virginia, applicable only when the plaintiff takes issue upon a plea, is of
negligible scope or utility.
However, a right to a trial by jury with a binding verdict in equity
cases has been widely prevalent in Georgia for 160 years, in Texas for
107 years, in Tennessee for 104 years, and in North Carolina (the later
phase) for 79 years. The statutory basis in Georgia and Tennessee
could have permitted greater restrictions than would have been possible
under the broad constitutional authority in North Carolina and Texas,
but, save in the treatment of compulsory references and in one or two
matters of practice, that has not occurred.
...
See CLARK, CODE PLEADING 102 (2d ed. 1947); Levin, Equitable Cleanup and the Jury, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 320, 322 (1951).
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The procedural environment for the experience in these four states
fias not been uniform. Tennessee, except for the overlap noted in the
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, still maintains separate law and
equity courts and procedures. North Carolina, through the Field Code
of Civil Procedure, and Georgia and Texas, by their indigenous practice
acts and rules, have fused the administration of law and equity into one
procedural system.
In most jurisdictions, the principal obstacle' 21 to the complete fusion
of law and equity procedures is the necessity for differentiating between
"legal" and "equitable" cases, issues, counterclaims, and 'defenses, under
constitutional guaranties of trial by jury that apply only at law. The
provision for a right of trial by jury with a binding verdict in equity
as well as at law in Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas, has removed
the most complete fusion
this obstacle and enabled these states to achieve
22
of law and equity in the United States.
See CLARK, CODE PL ADING 91-112 (2d ed. 1947); Kharas, A Century of
Law-Equity Merger in New York, 1 SYR. L. REv. 186, 199 (1949); State Farm
121

Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Mossey, 195 F. 2d 56 59 (7th Cir. 1952).
12 Compare Frank, J., in Bereslavsky v. daffey, U. S. District Judge, 161 F.
2d 499, 500 (2d Cir. 1947) (jury trial in patent infringement case) : "Defendant
seems to suggest that the Rules have completely obliterated, for all purposes, the
historic differences between 'law' and 'equity.' We cannot agree. Those who
favor it should have in mind that such obliteration might deprive us of the inestimably valuable flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation to newly
emerging problems which the principles of. equity have supplied in our legal
system. A transplanted civilian has shown us the disadvantages of a system in
which 'law' and 'equity' are fused not only in form but in substance, and another
writer has pointed to the danger that, if the courts are not watchful, the procedural
fusion may cause a substantive hardening of equity." Judge Frank cites Pekelis,
Legal Techniques and PoliticalIdeologies, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 665, 689, 691 1943
Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, 23 TEx. L. REv. 244
Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COL. L. REv. 1, 25, 29 (1905).

